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Abstract 
A proof of concept permissioned blockchain system that holds data from the 
Transport Data Logger, TDL, was developed. Transport chain actors who 
hand off TDL-equipped goods between one another use the TDL app to 
upload a digital handoff containing their identities and log data from and 
signed by the TDL to a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain network. 
The current Transport Data Logger system consists of a sensor-equipped 
device that interacts with a companion smartphone app using Bluetooth. The 
device is fastened to goods and will log temperature, humidity and more 
during transport. Upon delivery the recipient can connect to the TDL device 
with the smartphone app and retrieve the log data. The TDL system lacks 
cryptographic data protection and attribution of data points to specific 
transport chain actors other than in the form of comparing timestamps. 
The promise of blockchain is network-distributed, decentralized and 
immutable data storage and transaction conduction. Many very differing 
implementations of the blockchain concept exist, with their common factor 
being the sorting of data into an append-only list of blocks chronologically 
and cryptographically linked to one another in linear sequence. The greatest 
divisor of blockchain technology is between permissioned and permissionless 
blockchains. A permissioned blockchain system limits participation to known 
and approved entities, allowing much better performance at the cost of 
increased centralization. Full trust between participants is still not required, 
which is the great advantage of blockchain technology. 
There is potential for a gap in historical truth, what happened, and documental 
truth, what is documented as having happened. A blockchain is fully capable 
of protecting its data, or the documental truth, from tampering but closing the 
gap between the documental and historical truths requires more than just 
using blockchain technology. 
Blockchain technology is still nascent, and mainstream use beyond 
cryptocurrencies is years off. There is a large reliance on hype and signaling 
with blockchain technology, which means that much research and 
development of standards is needed before it can be properly treated as the 
cryptosystem it should be interpreted as. The thesis recommendation on 
blockchain adoption is two-fold: start now if getting in on the ground floor 
and helping to develop the underlying systems and standards is important, 
otherwise there is everything to gain from waiting until that work has been 
done, as the blockchain technology sector will be very volatile until then. 
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Popular Science Summary: 
Storing and attributing log data using blockchain 
technology 
Blockchain technology is incredibly young, even the most mature of the 
blockchain technologies are either functionally complete but very simple or 
lack important features. The thesis has assessed blockchain technology for 
implementation with the Bosch Transport Data Logger, TDL.  
The TDL is a sensor-equipped logging device with a companion 
smartphone app. The device is fastened to packages during transportation and 
logs how the packages have been handled while in the care of post and 
transport companies. For example, unacceptable temperatures, humidity and 
manhandling are logged.  
The two main types of blockchain technology, permissionless and 
permissioned, are found to have inherent trade-offs between open/closed 
participation and poor/good performance. Hyperledger Fabric, most mature 
of the permissioned blockchain systems, was used to build a TDL Blockchain 
System proof of concept. Log data and other information from and about the 
TDL devices, transferred by the transport company employees using the 
companion app, are stored on the blockchain. 
Generally, just saving sensor values is not enough to accomplish 
anything. To give credence to the logged data and to be able confidently to 
act upon it, the data must be made trustworthy. In an environment where data 
is generated while the sensor device is in the hands of different organizations, 
trustworthy connections between each data point and the organization 
responsible must be made. This to prevent blame-shifting of the type “it was 
like that when I got it”. To bring historical and documental truth closer to one 
another, further links between the real world and the data must be made, 
provided in part by devices needing to digitally sign the data logged by them.  
The thesis can be used by Bosch to learn about blockchain technology 
and its applicability for the TDL. If they or others want to extrapolate they 
could use the thesis results to draw conclusions for other similar devices and 
systems. The general thesis recommendation is two-fold. If an organization 
simply wants to implement blockchain technology applications and not help 
develop the underlying technology the blockchain technology sector is not 
yet ready for them, otherwise now is a good time to jump in. 
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1. Introduction 
As the steps in a transport chain increases the more distrust between 
transport chain actors (companies) can be expected as those who commit 
errors while handling sensitive goods would most likely want to shift the 
blame to another actor in the transport chain. The Bosch Transport Data 
Logger, TDL, was created to determine what conditions a package equipped 
with a TDL device is exposed to during transport.  
This thesis will look at how blockchain technology can be used to make 
the data generated by the TDL more reliable and how it can be used to 
pinpoint what transport chain actor had responsibility for the package when 
any sort of unacceptable conditions were logged. 
 Background 
The Transport Data Logger system consists of a sensor-equipped device 
that interacts with a companion smartphone app. The device is fastened to 
goods during transport and set up using the app to tolerate certain threshold 
sensor values including temperature, impacts and humidity (and more), with 
readings exceeding those values being logged as violations. The recipient can 
then connect to the TDL device with the smartphone app upon delivery of the 
goods and then view (and share) the log data. 
The problem of “it was like this when I got it” can potentially be solved 
by logging if and when conditions damaging to the goods occur at any time 
during transportation, recording every handoff between actors in the transport 
chain and protecting the recorded data from manipulation. 
In its current form the TDL system lacks cryptographic protection or 
attribution of violation data to specific transport chain actors, other than in 
the form of manually comparing timestamps.  
Data verification today relies heavily on having a common trusted third 
party that vouches for the dependability, source and integrity of that data. 
Blockchain technology promises to provide network-distributed, 
decentralized and immutable data storage and transaction conduction. This 
would eliminate the need to completely trust a single third party to verify the 
integrity or existence of some data. Instead trust is put in the collective that is 
made up of entities collaborating in a blockchain network. 
Some form of consensus building methodology is needed to make sure 
that the blockchains at all entities nodes are identical, making the figurative 
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collective blockchain stable. All good consensus building methods are tamper 
resistant in that for tampering to occur, many different actors on the 
blockchain network must collaborate. With a traditional single centralized 
database only direct changes to the database would be needed for tampering 
to succeed. 
The brute-force nature of creating new blocks for proof-of-work 
consensus blockchains has led to that form of block creation being called 
“mining”. 
 Problem Statements 
These three questions are good to keep in the reader’s mind as they are 
the guiding lights of the thesis report.  
Question 1. What are the different strengths and weaknesses of 
permissioned and permissionless blockchains? 
To decide what type of blockchain system should be used for the TDL 
Blockchain System, the defining characteristics of the two main types of 
blockchain technology must be determined. Identifying how blockchain 
technology works is also important in being able to answer the other questions 
in the problem statement. 
Question 2. How can blockchain technology be used to increase the 
reliability of the Transport Data Logger data? 
Question 3. How can blockchain technology be used to attribute specific 
data points from the Transport Data Logger to specific transport chain actors? 
To be able to use the data generated by the TDL to make well-informed 
decisions that data must be determined to be reliable, meaning accurate and 
unmanipulated. It must also be possible to directly attribute specific data to 
transport chain actors, preventing them from shifting blame away from 
themselves. 
 Method 
This thesis is exploratory in nature, at the beginning a vague 
approximation of what would later become Question 2 and Question 3 as well 
as the intent to develop a proof of concept was used to create a schedule and 
method outline (a project plan). 
As the author could not for several very important reasons commit any 
more time to the thesis than the standard one semester this thesis was from 
the start conducted to fit inside of those 20 weeks (5 months). Other thesis 
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projects known to the author had exhibited a tendency to expand time to fit 
the scope and to prevent that from happening care was taken from the start to 
create and stick to a reasonable schedule, method and scope. The schedule 
outline looked roughly like the following: development finished by end of 
month 3, complete draft of thesis report before end of month 4, presentation 
done before end of month 5. As time progressed this schedule outline was 
filled in with considerably more details. The phases of the thesis project are 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 
Research Development Development Writing Writing 
Presenting 
Finishing up 
Fig. 1. The method outline showing the 5 months of the project and the 
phases they contained. This is a simplified version of reality as for 
example outline drafts of the thesis were created during the research 
phase and research in one form or another was conducted during 
almost all project phases. 
The method outline was to spend the first month exploring the blockchain 
technology field and doing much of the necessary research for the thesis. This 
included Lund University Libraries1 and Swedish thesis report2 searches for 
terms like, or related to, “blockchain”. It also included looking at interesting 
references and technologies from the results of those searches. The initial 
research phase also included looking through Bosch internal development 
documentation for the TDL, exploring the TDL’s capabilities, and setting up 
all the practicalities required for development of the proof of concept. Initial 
decisions around the design of the TDL Blockchain System and its proof of 
concept based on the research findings were made by the end of this phase. 
The next phase was the development phase that consisted of two months 
of software development of the TDL Blockchain system proof of concept. As 
everything in a blockchain system is dependent on the chaincode 
development started with that and then moved on to the network, and then 
client. Development progress and planning was strongly influenced by 
                                                          
 
1 The LUBSearch service at website lubsearch.lub.lu.se was used. 
2 The National Library of Sweden Libris service for finding student papers called 
Uppsök at website http://uppsok.libris.kb.se/sru/uppsok was used. 
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difficulties encountered during the process. Decisions were always made with 
the knowledge that time was a limited resource.  
Once the main use case for the TDL Blockchain System was supported 
the development phase was over. It was followed by a month-long thesis 
report writing phase. Writing the thesis was mostly done chapter by chapter. 
An outline of the thesis chapters and their contents had been worked on during 
the research phase and writing continued from that as well as the lessons 
learned during development. While focus was kept on one chapter at a time 
the outline of the entire thesis was still worked on all throughout the writing 
process. Research complemented the actual writing work all throughout this 
phase. 
The final month of the project was spent finishing and polishing the thesis 
report based on feedback, preparing and performing presentations and 
working to complete all other requirements associated with the final phase of 
a thesis project. Opposition could unfortunately not be arranged before the 
end of the five months and as such spilled into the subsequent semester. This 
was unfortunate but ultimately acceptable. 
All throughout the thesis project a daily diary was kept and weekly status 
reports to the supervisors were made. This, along with the rigorous use and 
iterative development of the project plan containing the schedule and 
decisions around method and scope, was crucial in keeping the project on 
track and on time. 
 Related Work 
Jeppsson and Olsson did a Master’s thesis on the usage of blockchains 
for tracking goods during transportation [1]. Their thesis focuses on the 
impact to the transport chain actors, offering an excellent complement to this 
thesis which focuses more on the security and technical aspects of such a 
blockchain system. Their thesis is highly recommended reading. 
In another related Master’s thesis Jansson and Petersen developed a 
framework for evaluating blockchain as a supply chain traceability system 
[2]. While their framework is not used in this thesis important topics brought 
up by them are addressed such as the difference between documental and 
historical accuracy. 
Yli-Huumo et al mapped out existing areas of blockchain research up 
until 2015 [3]. They concluded that 80% of research focused on Bitcoin 
specifically instead of the general field of blockchain technology. They also 
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summarize many areas of concern for blockchain technology such as 
throughput, latency, resource use, attack vectors and privacy. 
Important aspects of performance and scaling in blockchain systems is 
addressed by Scherer [4]. Many of his results, as supported by other sources, 
are important for highlighting the differences between permissioned and 
permissionless blockchain technology in this thesis. 
There is quite a bit of research and development going into blockchain 
applicability for supply chains as the area is considered “promising” [5]. Most 
of that work is primarily focused on moving the physical paperwork 
surrounding transportation to a digital system based on blockchain 
technology, and to then be able to trace a product through the entire supply 
chain with that blockchain data. As examples, [1] and [2] are already 
mentioned. See also [5, p. 23], [5] itself, and from industry see for example 
[6] and [7]. It is notable that much of this work is less than a year old, speaking 
to the emergent nature of blockchain technology. 
 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. 0 deals with cryptography, 
blockchain technology and explains the current TDL security solution. Part 
II deals with the TDL Blockchain System and its proof-of-concept 
implementation. Part III contains a discussion of blockchain technology and 
the TDL Blockchain System as well as potential future work and the thesis 
summary. 
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2. Cryptography 
An understanding of the basic concepts of modern cryptography is 
required understanding for many important aspects of blockchain technology. 
The field of modern cryptography is highly mathematics-based but those 
specifics are not required understanding for blockchain technology. 
To see roughly what section of cryptography aids understanding of what 
section of other cryptography and blockchain technology see Fig. 2. 
It helps to know this To understand the following 
Hashing Proof-of-work 
Signing 
Symmetric cryptography Asymmetric cryptography 
Sharing secret keys 
Asymmetric cryptography Signing 
Digital identities 
Permissioned blockchains 
Signing Proving origin/integrity of data 
Permissioned blockchains 
Digital identities Signing 
Permissioned blockchains 
Fig. 2. The cryptography areas on the left help in understand the areas of 
cryptography and blockchain technology on the right. 
Because of the basic nature of this section on cryptography the 
information is largely sourced from the lecture notes for EIT060 Computer 
Security held in 2017 at Lund University, Faculty of Engineering [8]. 
In cryptographic scenarios, it is common to use “Alice” and “Bob” to 
denote trusted parties wishing to communicate in some way, and “Eve” as 
someone wishing to eavesdrop or otherwise compromise the scenario. 
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 Kerckhoffs’ principle 
Cryptographic algorithms use keys to protect data, and Kerckhoffs’ 
principle states that a cryptosystem should remain secure even if everything 
about it, excluding its key, is public knowledge [9]. 
Related to Kerckhoffs’ principle is the general principle of only using 
cryptographic primitives that have been thoroughly tested using extensive 
research, also known as “don’t roll your own crypto” [10] [11]. 
 Hashing 
Hash functions, hash(𝑚) = ℎ, have two defining properties. Firstly, they 
should map a bit message of arbitrary length 𝑚 to a fixed-length output ℎ, see 
Fig. 3. Secondly, they should be computationally light.  
 
Fig. 3. Messages of varying length are run through the cryptographic hash 
function SHA3-256 generating hash values of the fixed length 256 
bits. 
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To make hash functions suitable for use in cryptography, three additional 
properties are needed. 
• Pre-image resistance: given a hash value ℎ, it is infeasible to find 
𝑚 such that hash(𝑚) = ℎ. 
• Second pre-image resistance: given a message 𝑚, it is infeasible 
to find 𝑚’ such that hash(𝑚) = hash(𝑚’).  
• Collision resistance: it is infeasible to find 𝑚 and 𝑚’ such that 
hash(𝑚) = hash(𝑚’). 
Cryptographic hash functions provide small representations of potentially 
much larger data. This is very valuable when signing data as without 
representing the data with its hash value the signature would have to be just 
as large as the data itself. Section 2.5 deals with signing data using 
asymmetric cryptography. 
 Symmetric cryptography 
Cryptography has historically only consisted of what we today call 
symmetric cryptography. It is used to send encrypted messages back and forth 
between trusted parties sharing a common secret key. This key is, as its name 
suggests, kept secret from everyone else. 
Alice and Bob trust each other and share a secret key 𝑘. Alice encrypts a 
plaintext message 𝑚 using the symmetric encryption function encrypt(𝑚, 𝑘) 
and sends the resulting ciphertext 𝑐 to Bob over some communication 
channel. After receiving the ciphertext Bob uses the corresponding 
decryption function decrypt(𝑐, 𝑘) providing it the same secret key that Alice 
encrypted the message with. The result, the original message 𝑚, can now be 
read by Bob. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Alice encrypts the message “HELLO FROM ALICE” using a secret 
key and sends it to Bob who uses that same key to decrypt the 
ciphertext “NVZHF JRJQ RDVQA” into the original message. Eve, 
who only has access to the ciphertext and not the key, is unable to 
access the message. 
The main advantage of symmetric encryption is speed and resource use. 
It is, in general, computationally lighter to encrypt and decrypt data with 
symmetric encryption than it is to use asymmetric cryptography, described in 
Section 2.4.  
2.3.1. Exchanging secret keys 
A problem is the need to share the secret key outside of the cryptosystem, 
which creates an attack vector. When describing a symmetric encryption 
system, it is generally assumed that the key is already shared between the 
trusted parties, leading to the alternate name “pre-shared key”. When 
describing symmetric encryption schemes, keys are assumed to be distributed 
in a safe manner outside the cryptosystem.  
It is common to use the slower asymmetric cryptography to exchange a 
secret key and then switch to symmetric cryptography for the rest of the 
session. 
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 Asymmetric cryptography 
Instead of being based on sharing a common secret key, asymmetric 
cryptography is based on the concept of having a pair of mathematically 
linked keys. Every participant holds one of these key pairs, keeping their 
“private key” secret while actively sharing their “public key”.  
One of the most famous asymmetric encryption schemes is RSA, named 
after its three creators Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. RSA uses a form of 
trapdoor function, taking advantage of the computational difficulty of finding 
the factors of large numbers. It is easy to multiply two large prime numbers 
to generate a very large number, but to find the two prime factors only 
knowing the large number is very difficult. 
Asymmetric cryptography can, in addition to its use in encryption, also 
be used to create digital signatures that ties data to a specific source. 
Signatures can also be used to validate that the data has not been changed 
since it was signed. 
2.4.1. Key pair 
The public and private keys are cryptographically linked in such a way 
that if you encrypt a message with the public key only someone who holds 
the private key can decrypt it. It is also important that it is infeasible to find 
the private key if you’re given the public key. These properties make it easy 
to verify that someone has access to a certain private key, you simply need to 
encrypt some random data with a public key and if they can decrypt it then 
you know that they have the associated private key. 
Note that the names “public” and “private” refer to how the keys are used. 
2.4.2. Asymmetric encryption and decryption 
A message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the 
private key. 
Alice has generated her key pair consisting of her public key 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐴 and 
private key 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴. Bob has, in turn, generated his own key pair 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐵 and 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐵. Alice and Bob have both shared their public keys 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐴 and 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐵 with 
one another in such a way that they both know that the respective key belongs 
to the other. 
Alice wants to send a plaintext message 𝑚 to Bob so she uses Bob’s 
public key 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐵 to encrypt the message into ciphertext 𝑐 using 𝑐 =
 encrypt(𝑚, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐵). She then sends 𝑐 to Bob who decrypts the message using 
𝑚 =  decrypt(𝑐, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐵). This is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Alice encrypts a message “HELLO FROM ALICE” using Bob’s 
public key. She sends the resulting ciphertext to Bob who decrypts 
it using his private key. Eve who knows both the ciphertext and 
Bob’s public key is unable to decrypt the message as she does not 
know Bob’s private key. 
It should be noted that the message is in practice not encrypted/decrypted 
immediately, some sort of pre- and post-processing should be implemented 
to prevent the identical messages from being encrypted to the same 
ciphertext, a fact that can otherwise be used by Eve to gain information about 
the messages sent [12]. 
 Signing 
To prove the origin of a message it is common to send a digital signature 
along with the message itself. 
The signing process begins with Alice in possession of her own key pair, 
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐴 and 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴, and her having shared her public key in such a way that 
everyone knows that she is really the owner of it. Alice wants to send a 
message 𝑚 to Bob so that Bob can verify that it came from her. 
Alice produces a hash value ℎ = hash(𝑚) of the message 𝑚 and 
generates a signature 𝑠 = sign(ℎ, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴) by signing ℎ using her private key 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴. 
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Alice now sends not only the message 𝑚 to Bob but also the signature 𝑠. 
Bob now verifies the signature, verify(𝑚, 𝑠, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐴), using Alice’s public key. 
He can then conclude whether the message he received was sent by Alice or 
not. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Alice sends the message “HELLO” to Bob. She also encrypts the 
hash of that message using her private key. Bob can then verify that 
the message he receives is the one Alice signed by decrypting the 
signature with Alice’s public key and comparing the hash value from 
it with his independently computed hash value of the message he 
received. 
Note that signing does not provide encryption of the message sent, that 
must be done separately. See [12] to learn more about the differences between 
signing and encryption with RSA.  
A final note on replay attacks, in which the same data and signature is 
provided multiple times. Consider a situation where you send status reports 
every five minutes. If you have data and signature for when ‘everything is 
fine’ you could send that same data and signature multiple times to avoid 
exposing that everything is not fine. To prevent you from doing that including 
a “number used once”, nonce, with the data would mean that the data and 
signature would not be accepted other than the first time it is sent. 
 Tying public keys to entities 
Being able to verify the connection between a public key and a private 
key is not same as verifying who the physical (or legal) entity behind that key 
pair is. A separate trusted third-party certificate authority is often used to 
attest that a specific key pair belongs to a specific entity. The certificate 
authority, CA, verifies that Alice is the entity associated with Alice’s public 
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key and creates a certificate asserting that to be true. The CA signs this 
certificate using its own private key. This is illustrated in Fig. 7. 
Instead of independently doing so, Alice, Bob and any other entities 
networking with each other place their trust in the certificate authority to 
verify that 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐴 belongs to Alice, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐵 belongs to Bob, and so on. The 
certificate provides a link between a physical identity and a digital identity 
(public key).  
For Alice to prove her physical identity in a digital system she can 
provide the certificate along with proof that she is in possession of the private 
key 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴. 
 
Fig. 7. A certificate authority verifies the link between Alice, the physical 
person, and Alice’s public key. The CA then creates a certificate 
stating that fact, signing it using the CA’s own private key. 
The certificate authority does not have to independently verify the 
identity of and create certificates for every single entity. Instead the certificate 
authority can, for example, create a certificate for an entire organization and 
then that organization can in turn create their own certificates for individuals 
within the organization. The way these certificates are linked together is 
illustrated in Fig. 8. This chain of certificates can then be accepted as identity 
verification. 
When verifying those individuals’ certificates, the verifier checks the 
chain of certificates all the way back to the original certificate authority, see 
Fig. 8. As a CA is considered the root of trust they sign their own certificate, 
thus forming the final link of the chain.  
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Fig. 8. Alice has a digital certificate of her physical identity and public key 
created by Org1CA. A separate certificate tying together Org1CA’s 
public key and physical identity is signed by CA. Finally, CA has a 
self-signed certificate. 
The importance of the role of certificate authorities as the root of trust in 
public key infrastructures, PKI, cannot be understated. Much of web security, 
such as HTTPS and TLS, depend on CAs. Additionally, many Swedes are 
likely familiar with BankID which is a digital identification service used by 
individuals to identify themselves to banks and authorities. This service is 
also dependent on certificate authorities. 
  
 18 
 
 
  
 19 
 
 
3. Blockchain technology 
A centralized database is hosted by a single entity and trust is put in that 
entity to maintain the security and integrity of that database. A distributed 
database provides redundancy, but full trust between all participants is still 
needed. Where blockchain technology comes into play is in areas where full 
trust of that kind is considered unachievable or undesirable.  
The basis of blockchain technology comes from two things. First is the 
data structure consisting of a sequence of data blocks tied cryptographically 
to one another in chronological order. The second is consensus-driven 
blockchain network distribution, with the data being replicated across 
mutually distrustful nodes. 
 Concept 
Blockchain technology promises network-distributed, decentralized and 
immutable data storage and transaction conduction. The information 
contained within the blocks make up a database where adding or changing 
information in that database comes in the form of appending new blocks to 
the blockchain. A block consists of a header, containing mostly metadata, and 
transactions that hold the actual blockchain information making up the 
database.  
Because of the append-only nature of blockchain technology any 
previous state of the database can be extracted by looking at the blocks up to 
a certain point. While a current value in the database can change, a history of 
all database operations is intrinsic to the append-only design of blockchains. 
Many very differing implementations of the blockchain concept exist, 
with their common factor being the sorting of data into an append-only list of 
blocks, chronologically and cryptographically linked to one another in linear 
sequence. Entities participating in a blockchain network, see Fig. 9, are all 
collectively responsible for maintaining the blockchain. 
Some form of consensus building methodology is needed to make sure 
that the blockchains at the network nodes are identical to one another, making 
the figurative collective blockchain stable. All good consensus methods are 
tamper resistant, meaning many separate malicious entities would have to 
collaborate for tampering to succeed. 
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Fig. 9. A simplified blockchain network layout. Each entity controls a 
network node. These communicate with one another in some way, 
with all of them holding their own blockchain. Any one network 
node’s blockchain should match that of the rest of the correct nodes, 
making a stable collective blockchain. 
Every block in the chain, except for the first “genesis block”, contains a 
cryptographic hash of the preceding block in the chain, illustrated in Fig. 10 
[3] [13] [14]. Depending on the specific blockchain system, certain demands 
can be put on these hashes. For example, in proof-of-work as implemented 
by Bitcoin the hash must contain a certain number of leading zeroes [15]. 
 
Fig. 10. The blockchain is examined at height 𝑛. The block at height 𝑛 + 1 
contains the hash of, or references, the previous block at height 𝑛. 
Similarly, the block at height 𝑛 references the block at height 𝑛 − 1. 
Note that no block references a subsequent block, all references are 
to preceding blocks. This means that while the block at 𝑛 only 
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references the block at 𝑛 − 1, any number of blocks could contain a 
reference to 𝑛. 
These cryptographic hashes are what tie blocks together and make the 
blockchain immutable. Depending on what specific blockchain technology is 
used this is a statement with some definite asterisks. The consensus finality 
property says that if a node appends a block to its blockchain no other node 
will append any other block before that one to their blockchain [14]. Without 
consensus finality, the blocks that make up the blockchain can change even 
though the blocks themselves are unchanged. The only difference is what 
blocks are considered part of the blockchain. For example, in the proof-of-
work system Bitcoin the series of blocks that are collectively accepted as 
constituting the blockchain can change if a longer sequence of blocks is 
found, even if it excludes blocks currently seen as part of the blockchain [14] 
[15]. This is known as the “longest chain” rule, illustrated in Fig. 11. Other 
scenarios exist where blockchains become similarly split and the question of 
which branch counts as “the one” is raised. If a blockchain has consensus 
finality, then once a block has been added to the blockchain it cannot be 
removed or replaced (by the consensus process). 
 
 
Fig. 11. Alice and Bob are participants in a blockchain network that uses the 
longest chain rule. At 𝑡 =  1 they both have matching blockchains 
up to the last block height, 7. There they separately created new valid 
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blocks at around the same time meaning either of their blockchains 
could be considered “the” blockchain. This constitutes a “fork” in 
the collective blockchain. The different blocks are considered 
different “branches”. At 𝑡 =  2 Bob happens to be the first of the 
two to mine a new height 8 block making his branch longer. Alice, 
who becomes aware of Bob’s new block at 𝑡 =  3, will now use the 
blocks from Bob as per the longest chain rule, abandoning the block 
7A that she previously considered part of the blockchain. 
 Consensus 
The term consensus in the context of blockchains is the process of making 
sure all “correct”, or alternatively “honest”, nodes have a shared and 
consistent blockchain [16]. This requires two abstracted elements [17]. The 
first is a state machine containing some form of logic, illustrated in Fig. 12. 
A state machine consists of state variables and commands [18]. The state is 
encoded using the state variables, and the commands are the state transitions 
from one valid state to another. In the case of blockchain technology, the state 
is the blockchain itself and the state changes are the additions of new blocks 
to that blockchain. 
 
Fig. 12. A simple state transition diagram. The diagram contains three states, 
A, B and C. The state transition arrows indicate possible changes of 
the current state. Using the terminology of state variables and 
commands there is one variable that has the possible values of “A”, 
“B” and “C”. Commands can change that variable value from A to 
B, B to A, B to C and C to A. 
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The second element is a replication management, or consensus, protocol 
that coordinates node interactions with the state machine. Consensus needs to 
be achieved and then maintained. First some common state must be shared 
between all state machines. Second, an agreement must be met on any new 
state change to make sure that all nodes reach the same new state. Important 
for the decentralized nature of blockchain technology is that this is done 
without trusting any one entity fully. 
This description of consensus is abstract for a reason. The area of 
blockchain technology is sprawling and very disparate forms of consensus 
building exist. This makes it hard to describe them collectively without 
referring to some abstracted common ground.  
It is also a good idea to assume that not all nodes behave correctly but 
that they can also be “Byzantine”. The term, explained in Section 3.2.1, in 
short means that a node can fail or misbehave in a way that threatens the 
integrity of a network-system not protected against Byzantine behavior. 
A fundamental threat is if some sufficiently large number of malign 
blockchain network participants collaborate to subvert the integrity of the 
blockchain system [13] [14]. Participants holding some large enough network 
power would in extension obtain power over the blockchain itself. Power that 
would, depending on the specifics of the system, include the ability to replace 
parts of the blockchain and to censor any new transactions for any reason [13] 
[19]. Having some large enough majority of non-Byzantine nodes is critical 
to both proof-of-work and Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus [14]. 
A single entity could potentially connect a disproportionate number of 
nodes to the blockchain network. Section 3.2.2 contains information on 
attacks where multiple identities are used by the same entity. 
The two main types of blockchains, permissionless and permissioned, are 
explored in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Their specific consensus methods are 
explained in Sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.6.2 and 3.6.3. 
3.2.1. Byzantine nodes 
Using Byzantine as a shorthand for misbehaving nodes is terminology 
originating in the Byzantine Generals Problem. The problem deals with 
agreeing on some common data in a distrustful environment. 
The problem is summarized in [20] as “a group of generals of the 
Byzantine army camped with their troops around an enemy city. 
Communicating only by messenger, the generals must agree upon a common 
battle plan. However, one or more of them may be traitors who will try to 
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confuse the others. The problem is to find an algorithm to ensure that the loyal 
generals will reach agreement.” 
Protection against byzantine nodes is always in relationship to the total 
number of nodes in the network. See Sections 3.5 and 3.6.3 for specific 
thresholds for tolerance of Byzantine nodes. 
3.2.2. Sybil attacks 
A single entity has the potential to present several different and seemingly 
unrelated identities to gain some unproportionate amount of power in a peer-
to-peer system, something that is known as a Sybil attack [21]. 
Because the resilience of blockchain technology lies in the data structure 
and distribution network in combination, one being subjectively useless 
without the other, a blockchain system using distribution susceptible to Sybil 
attacks would eliminate any trust for that blockchain system. 
The distribution of blockchain network power could, using a Sybil attack, 
be shifted so a single entity gains control over the collective blockchain. Two 
current solutions to this problem exist, one being that network participation 
is limited to verified identities, and the other that blockchain network power 
is proportional to the resources being contributed to the consensus process, 
see Section 3.6 and 3.5.  
 Chaincode and smart contracts 
Some form of logic is needed to decide what constitutes a transaction on 
the blockchain. Many cryptocurrency blockchain systems have this logic 
built-in as it only needs to support a small set of features such as transferring 
cryptocurrency tokens from one owner to another. To support more general 
use cases, the concept of “chaincode” running on the blockchain network was 
introduced. 
The related term “smart contract” comes with some baggage, see [22], 
and to avoid the implications that come with that name the Hyperledger 
Fabric term chaincode will be used unless specifically referring to a smart 
contract. 
Chaincode is described in [23] as “software, running on a ledger 
[blockchain], to encode assets and the transaction instructions (business 
logic) for modifying the assets”. This is a pretty concise description and for a 
programmer chaincode doesn’t look all that different from any other software 
implementing some form of business logic. 
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With the risk of introducing confusion by making two similar analogies 
chaincode can also be described using state machines. The assets of 
chaincode constitute the state machine variables and the changes made to 
those assets are the state transitions. 
In a permissionless blockchain system executing chaincode is associated 
with payment in the form of cryptocurrency but no such payment is required 
in a permissioned system [5]. 
 State of blockchain security 
There has been an explosion in research of blockchain technology in the 
past few years although a large majority of that research has been centered on 
Bitcoin as opposed to the technology in general [3]. 
It is argued that while blockchain technology should be developed and 
evaluated like a cryptographic system, many of the blockchain systems 
currently in existence have been created in ignorance of such development 
processes [17]. 
Neha Narula, who is one of the discoverers of a rather obvious but very 
severe security vulnerability in the blockchain system IOTA, argues the 
following [11]: 
“Though the [blockchain] technology is exciting, the due diligence 
required to make sound investments in the technology isn’t keeping up with 
the pace of the hype. Aside from the financial risk, I don’t think developers 
and investors are thoroughly evaluating these systems technically, either. 
Many investors are relying on signaling — if enough well-known institutions 
like universities or large companies sign on as investors or advisors, it 
indicates approval of the project and its software. The problem is that some 
of these technologies have serious issues, and the large companies and well-
known individuals either aren’t doing due diligence and investing the 
resources and time needed to evaluate the projects with which they are 
partnering, or aren’t sharing their findings with everyone else. The 
cryptocurrency space still doesn’t have a good way to assess these projects.” 
The security vulnerability in question was a result of IOTA developers 
breaking the mantra against rolling one’s own crypto, see Section 2.1, as they 
had created their own hash function that could not withstand differential 
cryptanalysis [24]. Narula puts her finger on a subjectively large issue with 
blockchain technology today. There is a lot of work being done in the field 
but little of that work is dedicated to making sure the blockchain systems are 
secure and trustworthy. 
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Not only attacks to the blockchain systems themselves need to be 
considered. Attacks on chaincode could lead to results just as devastating as 
if the target had been the blockchain system itself.  
As part of a larger survey of attacks on smart contracts for the blockchain 
system Ethereum the somewhat infamous “DAO attack” is investigated in 
[25]. The DAO was a form of decentralized investment system where 
investors of the DAO could vote to choose where their collective investments 
should go. They raised 10.7 million in Ethereum cryptocurrency Ether, 
valued at USD 120 million [26]. A large portion of that investment was later 
stolen using vulnerabilities present in the DAO smart contract [25]. The 
attack led to a schism in the Ethereum community as a hard fork was made to 
reverse the transfers that constituted the theft [27]. Ethereum Classic, a 
version of Ethereum “free from censorship, fraud or third party [sic] 
interference”, was created as a reaction to the perceived wrongdoings of this 
hard-fork solution to the DAO attack [28].  
Beyond the implications to chaincode security considerations, this 
sequence of events is a great illustration that the immutability associated with 
blockchain technology is not some absolute property but a result of consensus 
among network participants. This is not limited to just the participating 
network nodes but extends to the actual people in charge of those nodes.  
 Permissionless blockchains 
The primary identifier of a permissionless blockchain system is its open 
participation model where anyone can join or leave the blockchain network 
at any time [14]. The largest problem associated with such anonymous 
networks, Sybil attacks, is solved by linking participation to real-world 
resource use [14]. Bitcoin and Ethereum are the two prominent systems used 
to exemplify permissionless blockchain systems in this thesis. 
An adversary hoping to gain blockchain network control must control 
most of the total CPU-cycles being spent “mining” blocks for the blockchain 
to be successful, something known as a “51%” or “majority” attack [19]. This 
means that the more decentralized the network the less likely a majority attack 
is to succeed. It was however shown in 2014 that it is possible to achieve a 
successful “Selfish Mining strategy” attack on the Bitcoin system with a 25% 
minority [13].  
Because the reliance of a permissionless system is based on the network 
being decentralized the organization of “miners” (nodes) into “mining pools” 
for sharing block creation awards effectively increases centralization and thus 
decreases the resilience of the system [13] [14]. 
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As all blockchain data is shared to the network and network participation 
is completely open any data stored on a permissionless blockchain should be 
considered public. See [5, p. 25] for a short discussion on blockchain data 
privacy. The authors of [5] advocate storing sensitive data “off-chain” with 
only the hash “on-chain”. This allows for verification but not direct protection 
as the off-chain stored data is most likely more vulnerable to, for example, 
deletion. Finding what hash is linked to what data could also be a source of 
additional system complexity. 
3.5.1. Proof-of-work 
Pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto introduced proof-of-work consensus with 
the original Bitcoin whitepaper [15]. The generation of blocks depends on 
solving a hard cryptographical puzzle where any solution is easy to verify 
[29]. 
As previously mentioned each block in a blockchain contains the hash of 
the previous block. The specific data included in that hash varies with the 
specific protocol used but in general a summary of the block data along with 
some block metadata is used. Each block’s hash must match a certain pattern, 
in Bitcoin this pattern is a certain amount of leading zero bits [15]. Finding a 
match to the pattern is the cryptographical puzzle. 
As hashing the same data always leads to the same hash value a nonce is 
included as part of the block. Using different nonce values changes the hash 
of the block. This is illustrated in Fig. 13.The pattern rule is enforced by the 
network nodes as they only accept blocks generated by other nodes if, in 
addition to the other verifications, the hash of that block matches the pattern. 
Attempt Block data Nonce 
value 
Hash value Matches 
pattern? 
1478998384 3b96bb7e… 869292030 43862b5ec7… No 
1478998385 3b96bb7e… 169950584 ee084c2518… No 
1478998386 3b96bb7e… 208296255 0000000027… Yes 
Fig. 13. A few attempts at finding a hash value that matches the pattern 
required by proof-of-work, in this example case the pattern is 8 
leading zero bytes. The block data remains the same for each attempt 
but the nonce value changes leading to the hash value of them both 
combined changing between each attempt. On the bottom attempt in 
the figure the hash value contains 8 leading zeroes and as such 
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matches the pattern. The nonce value and the other block data will 
now be propagated to the network as a complete block. 
Every bitcoin block mined awards the miner with a bitcoin currency 
reward and this is what incentivizes entities to engage in the mining process 
[15]. As the number of bitcoins awarded for every block decreases, the long-
term mining incentive is expected to be transaction fees [15]. Currently, 
Ethereum has a fixed reward but this may change in the future considering 
the planned move to proof-of-stake [30] [31]. 
Proof-of-work systems can scale to thousands of mining nodes and clients 
[4] [14]. This goes well with the goal of decentralization as supporting 
thousands of nodes also means that thousands of separate entities can 
participate in the blockchain network. The pooling of resources into mining 
pools does go against this decentralization principle.  
Despite supporting thousands of network nodes and clients, performance 
and scalability of another kind becomes a large issue in proof-of-work 
systems [4]. 
The closer a transaction’s block is to the end of the blockchain the less 
mining work is protecting it from being replaced using another longer 
sequence of blocks [15]. This lack of consensus finality, see Section 3.1 for a 
definition, has given rise to the recommendation that for Bitcoin one should 
wait for 6 blocks to be appended to the one with the transaction in it, taking 
roughly 60 minutes, for the transaction to be considered properly committed 
[14]. This results in transactions having a very high latency. This is in addition 
to the already low transaction bandwidth that with Bitcoin has a theoretical 
high of 7 transactions per second [14]. 
The mining process uses a large amount of CPU-cycles3 and, in 
extension, electricity. This massive resource use is comparable to that of 
entire countries such as Denmark and Ireland [32] [33]. This can arguably be 
considered a massive waste. 
The proof-of-work derivation used in Ethereum is called Ethash [34]. It 
mitigates some issues associated with Bitcoins proof-of-work consensus [4] 
[34]. Ultimately, the proof-of-work performance limitations, including high 
latencies and low bandwidth, are inherent to the method itself [14]. 
                                                          
 
3 CPU-cycles is used generally in this context. Currently much of Bitcoin mining is 
done with purpose-built mining hardware. 
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3.5.2. Proof-of-stake 
In contrast to proof-of-work there is no “mining” in a proof-of-stake 
system. Block confirmation is based on in-system investment using the 
assumption that anyone with enough investment into the system would want 
to see it continue functioning. One example of a cryptocurrency that uses 
proof-of-stake consensus is BlackCoin [35]. 
Most proof-of-stake protocols currently proposed are susceptible to 
several attacks and proof-of-stake only accounts for less than 2% of 
cryptocurrency market capitalization [36]. Because of this assessing the 
usability of proof-of-stake in blockchain systems is, can, and will be the 
subject of entire theses. 
Ethereum is likely to adopt a proof-of-stake system called Casper in their 
future Serenity milestone [37]. The basic idea behind Casper is that consensus 
will be reached by the participants (validators) placing bets on which block 
is going to become the next to be included in the blockchain. After enough 
validators have placed large enough bets on a single block it is considered 
finalized and every bet on any other block will be distributed as winnings to 
the validators who bet on the ‘winning’ block. The aim with Casper is to 
encourage betting on blocks that are likely to be accepted by the majority and 
to punish those who bet against the majority [38]. 
 Permissioned blockchains 
In contrast to permissionless blockchains where anyone can set up a node 
and connect to the blockchain network a permissioned blockchain network 
limits participation to known and approved entities. This is in practice 
achieved by a collaborating group of organizations. The main advantage 
compared to permissionless blockchains is increased transaction bandwidth 
and lower latency [4].  
Permissioned blockchains will, in this thesis, be exemplified using mostly 
Hyperledger Fabric. The term “ledger” is often used in Hyperledger 
documentation and terminology to refer to the blockchain-based data storage 
but this thesis will continue to use the term “blockchain”. 
3.6.1. The Hyperledger project 
There are several different blockchain projects in varying levels of 
development, from incubation to production, all organized under the 
Hyperledger project from the Linux Foundation. Several high-profile 
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companies have chosen to gather their permissioned blockchain efforts under 
the Hyperledger banner [39] [40]. 
The Hyperledger project is envisioned as being decades long and the goal 
is to gather all viable permissioned blockchain solutions, allowing them to 
grow and to see which technologies emerge as the eventual “winners” [41]. 
Fabric and Sawtooth are the two projects furthest along in development, with 
a few production-level Fabric-based projects and some Sawtooth “late-stage 
pilots” [41]. 
Hyperledger Fabric is originally contributed by IBM and is the only 
project to have a 1.0 release at the time of writing [42]. It will be explained 
in more detail in Section 3.7. 
Hyperledger Sawtooth uses a consensus algorithm based on “Proof of 
Elapsed Time”, see Section 3.6.2. It uses a trusted execution technology to 
provide this proof and the network node responsible to provide the proof is 
chosen through a lottery system [17] [43]. 
Hyperledger Iroha has the goal of providing reusable components (code 
libraries, consensus, chaincode/smart contracts) to the other Hyperledger 
projects. 
Hyperledger Burrow is contributed by Monax and it features an Ethereum 
Virtual Engine using a proof-of-stake Tendermint consensus engine. See [17] 
for more information about this specific consensus method. 
Hyperledger Indy “provides tools, libraries, and reusable components for 
providing digital identities rooted on blockchains” [39].  
Fabric, Sawtooth and Iroha are currently in active development while 
Burrow and Indy are in incubation status [44]. Considering the goals and 
development status of the Hyperledger projects, only Fabric and Sawtooth 
will be discussed further. 
3.6.2. Proof of elapsed time 
Proof of elapsed time, PoET, was created as a response to the knowledge 
of proof-of-work serving as a resource hungry distributed timestamping 
machine. PoET was developed to achieve the same result but with massively 
decreased resource use. The result in question is trust in that a certain amount 
of time has passed between each block. It leverages Intel Software Guard 
Extensions, SGX, to provide attestation that a certain amount of time has 
passed, with the assumption that the trusted execution technology cannot be 
subverted. This is potentially problematic as during the writing of this thesis 
security flaws subverting Intel’s trusted computing technologies were 
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identified [45]. This is in addition to previous research on attacks against SGX 
[46] [47]. 
Because of proof-of-work similarities, PoET has the potential to be used 
in permissionless blockchains as well as permissioned ones [17]. Where 
proof-of-work uses CPU-cycles as the ticket of entry, PoET uses the 
availability of hardware supporting Intel SGX [17] [48]. As CPU-cycles are 
a far more ubiquitous resource this puts a lot of trust and some measure of 
centralization with Intel. The centralization comes from the fact that the 
distribution of Intel SGX compatible hardware will in practice form a barrier 
of entry not present in proof-of-work [17]. 
Finding a valid block hash in proof-of-work can be compared to simply 
waiting an amount of time and then propagating a block to the network with 
the proof of that time having elapsed, namely the block hash matching a 
certain pattern [17] [48]. Proof of elapsed time takes this literally and uses 
SGX to wait for some time and once that time has passed a node can use that 
SGX-generated proof as part of the block data and propagate that block to the 
rest of the network [17] [48]. Like with proof-of-work, PoET does not provide 
consensus finality as forks are created when new blocks are generated in close 
time proximity to one another [17]. 
PoET eliminates the massive resource use associated with proof-of-work 
at the cost of putting trust and power in the hands of a single hardware vendor 
[17] [48]. 
3.6.3. Byzantine fault tolerant consensus 
Requiring nodes to have known identities allows the use of Byzantine 
fault-tolerant, BFT, consensus protocols [14]. These types of database 
replication protocols have a several decades long history and much research 
exists in the area [14] [49] [50]. BFT protocols have several important 
advantages over proof-of-work protocols, most importantly performance and 
resource use. 
According to both [4] and [14] there is an apparent inherent tradeoff 
between transaction performance and node scalability. BFT protocols have 
great performance, tens of thousands of transactions per second [50] and low 
latency overhead of less than 100ms [51], but is only tested up to twenty 
nodes [14].  
When one becomes aware of the 𝑂(𝑛2) inter-node communication 
involved, see Fig. 14, the reason behind the limited node scaling of BFT 
protocols becomes apparent.  
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Fig. 14. Visualization of communication between nodes (P0-P3) performing 
BFT consensus. Adapted from [50, p. 148. Figure 2] and [52, p. 87. 
Figure 9]. 
Historically the protocol Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance, PBFT, has 
been the earliest and almost only real-world usable BFT protocol [50]. More 
recently BFT-SMaRT has, with several improvements over PBFT, taken over 
as a more current implementation of Byzantine fault tolerance and it is used 
by several blockchain systems [17] [50]. 
BFT protocols protect against Byzantine nodes, but only if they do not 
make up more than a third of the total number of nodes [14]. 
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 Hyperledger Fabric 
Hyperledger Fabric can currently be considered the flagship Hyperledger 
project as it is the longest-running and is the furthest along the development 
process. 
3.7.1. Consensus and node responsibilities 
Consensus in Fabric is a bit more involved than ‘just’ nodes propagating 
valid blocks to the rest of the network as with, for example, Bitcoin [53]. In 
earlier stages of development Fabric used native PBFT but architecture 
changes mean that the current 1.0 release does not include BFT consensus 
[17]. As adding BFT-SMaRT is part of current development, it should be 
noted that the current lack of protection against node subversion is a product 
of release scheduling and not inherent to Fabric [17]. This thesis will assess 
Fabric as if it uses BFT consensus.  
The architecture changes for the 1.0 release were to separate some node 
responsibilities into different types of nodes [17]. The current division is into 
three types of nodes: clients, peers and orderers [54]. 
Before the node responsibilities are specified further, note that 
transactions in Hyperledger Fabric come in the form of “invoking” chaincode 
and then having the result of that invocation committed to the blockchain 
[54]. The network can contain several different chaincode stored on different 
subsets of peers [54]. 
A client node is the active driver of the transaction process, explained in 
Section 3.7.2. The client invokes a certain chaincode at some peer, requesting 
the peers’ endorsement of the transaction [54]. The client then sends the 
endorsed transaction to the ordering service that performs a total-order 
broadcast to the network [54]. 
A peer holds their copy of the blockchain with new blocks being provided 
to them by the ordering service [54]. Peers can serve as “endorsers”, where 
they endorse transactions before they can be committed. An endorser 
‘emulates’ the execution of chaincode invocations and the result is either 
endorsed or rejected [54]. Chaincode has individual endorsement policies, 
requiring the endorsement from peers from a certain specified set of 
participating organizations for the network to consider a transaction involving 
that chaincode valid [53]. 
The orderers form the ordering service and can, if the system is 
configured to do it, keep their own copies of the blockchain [54]. The name 
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quite simply comes from the service performing the total-order broadcast of 
all transactions to the rest of the network [54]. 
Even invalid transactions are stored on the nodes’ blockchains, although 
without affecting the actual blockchain database, to preserve the history of all 
transactions [54]. The blockchain database in Fabric is known as the state, 
modeled as a key-value store [54]. 
Once BFT-SMaRT is implemented, Fabric will be able to withstand up 
to a third of participating ordering nodes being subverted [17]. Remember 
that chaincode still needs to be properly designed, maintained and updated, 
read Section 3.3 for more. In addition, providing a chaincode endorsement 
policy that matches the stakes of the network is important. If an endorsement 
policy only requires a single organization to endorse transactions for that 
chaincode, nothing will prevent them from performing arbitrary changes to 
the key-value store associated with that chaincode. 
3.7.2. Transaction process 
Clients are the drivers of the transaction process. For the purposes of this 
explanation assume that the network is already up and running with all 
necessary steps taken to enable some type of example transaction. For an 
illustration of the transaction process, see Fig. 15. 
The transaction process starts with a client sending a transaction proposal 
to the network peers, specifying what chaincode should be invoked, and any 
input parameters required by the specific invocation [55]. 
The peers run a simulation of the chaincode invocation and make sure 
that the result is valid as defined by the chaincode [55]. The result in question 
is a set of read/write instructions for the key-value state [55]. After 
performing all the necessary verifications, the peers send a proposal response 
back to the client, including their result and endorsement [55].  
The client gathers the proposals into a transaction after verifying that the 
results are all the same [55]. This transaction is then sent to the ordering 
service, the orderer nodes, who collect it with any other transactions, checks 
for conflicting read/write sets, and forms them into a block [55]. The ordering 
service then propagates the block to the peers and they all commit the block 
to their copies of the blockchain. Not until the block is committed are the 
read/write sets of the chaincode invocations used to update the state of the 
key-value store. 
The transaction process is concluded by the client receiving an event 
message broadcast by the network peers acknowledging the committal of the 
transaction. 
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Fig. 15. A simple overview of the transaction process. A client submits a 
transaction proposal to the peers who respond with proposal 
responses. These responses are sent together as a transaction to the 
orderers who gather multiple transactions into a block. The block is 
sent to the peers who notify the client that its transaction has been 
committed to the blockchain. 
Note that identities, results, signatures, endorsements etc. are checked by 
the involved peers and orderers at each step of the transaction process, even 
when not mentioned explicitly above [53] [55]. 
3.7.3. Participation and permissions 
In the general case organizations are responsible for maintaining their 
own public key infrastructure, PKI. The participating organizations’ public 
key infrastructures are connected to the larger Fabric network and serve as 
the providers and verifiers of digital identities and signatures used therein 
[53]. The connection between the Fabric network and the PKIs is done with 
Membership Service Providers, MSPs [56]. The connection between the 
MSPs and the actual blockchain is configuration blocks, including the genesis 
block [56]. Configuration blocks also contain other information needed to set 
up a network or channel [23]. 
A single network can contain one or more channels, a feature introduced 
with the 1.0 architecture change that aims to allow separation of more or less 
private data and/or logic from the rest of the network [53]. For this purpose, 
Fabric blockchains exist on a per-channel basis instead of a per-network basis 
[53].  
 36 
 
 
The network and channels can be configured to allow for specific 
organizations to have different levels of permissions. Some organizations 
could, for example, only be permitted to run clients and some could be 
allowed to install/update chaincode [57] [56]. 
Unfortunately, a very crucial feature that has yet to be implemented is 
chaincode-level access control [58] [59]. This is a planned feature that would 
allow chaincode to react differently to a specific chaincode invocator (client) 
belonging to a specific organization or holding some specific title/role at that 
organization. The current lack of such a feature is problematic for many use 
cases, including the one in this thesis’ proof of concept. Lu and Xu put it 
mildly when they say that “unauthorized users could accidentally trigger a 
permissionless function” [5]. 
 Summary 
Blockchain technology achieves consensus for, and immutably stores, 
some sort of data in an environment where entities in separate, mutually 
distrustful, trust domains want to achieve just that. This functionality is 
dependent on careful considerations and practices in developing and 
maintaining the blockchain system, network, the participating actor power 
balance, and the chaincode. 
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4. Transport Data Logger 
The Transport Data Logger, TDL, was developed by Bosch Connected 
Devices and Solutions. Its functionality is to gather environmental sensor data 
for goods while they are being transported.  
 Tracking conditions during shipping 
The TDL use case is illustrated in Fig. 16. The TDL device is mounted to 
a package that is going to be shipped and it is controlled by a smartphone 
companion application communicating over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 
[60]. The TDL is first paired to the smartphone of the package sender who 
sets up the logging conditions [61]. This includes specifying the limits of what 
the shipped goods should be able to handle without a violation being recorded 
by the TDL [61]. Examples of violations are too high/low temperature, 
humidity, violent shocks and/or the package being moved using an incorrect 
orientation (tipping) [61]. At setup, a PIN-code is set that is used by the TDL 
device to protect changes to the setup configuration, resetting the TDL to 
factory settings, retrieval of the complete log data and to control if logging is 
turned on or not [61].  
After setup, the TDL starts logging the orientation, temperature and 
humidity at the time interval specified during setup [61]. Any shocks are 
recorded at the time they happen. In this thesis, threshold value violations are 
all referred to as data points and collectively as the log data. The package with 
the TDL is then sent through the entire transport chain without any further 
communication with the outside world until it reaches the ultimate 
destination. Anyone can still pair with the TDL at any time and view the 
summary information that is available without use of the PIN [61]. 
The final recipient pairs the smartphone application to the TDL and can 
now choose to stop logging as the PIN is known to them [61]. After that they 
can download the complete set of log data and share it however they see fit.  
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Fig. 16. Alice sets up the TDL parameters and starts the TDL logging 
functionality using the TDL app on her smartphone. The TDL, 
attached to its package, goes through the entire transport chain. Once 
Bob receives the package he can use the TDL app on his smartphone 
to stop the logging and download the data using the PIN supplied to 
him by Alice. 
Violations are described as “clearly assignable to the stations throughout 
the entire supply chain” in the marketing materials for the TDL system [62]. 
This is based on manually comparing violation timestamps as recorded by the 
TDL device with any external documentation available in regards to the 
transportation of the TDL-enabled goods. 
Many details regarding the TDL (and transportation in general) is left out 
of this thesis as data and computer security is the main area of interest. 
 Baseline version 
As the TDL is in active development at Bosch at the time of writing a 
baseline was chosen for the thesis to prevent the problem of working towards 
a moving target. TDL model TDL110 with firmware version 1.0.15 and TDL 
Android app version 1.2.3 was chosen as those were the most recent stable 
external releases at the time the thesis project started in August/September 
2017. 
 Security solution 
Unless it was made clear previously the software security solution of the 
TDL is completely dependent on the use of a PIN to protect against 
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unauthorized changes. This protects against many trivial manipulations over 
Bluetooth such as disabling logging. It however does not protect against more 
advanced schemes such as opening the TDL case and doing direct 
manipulations to the flash storage of the device. Such an attack would be of 
much higher sophistication.  
Other scenarios exist where the TDL can be successfully manipulated 
using much lower sophistication. The sensors themselves could be tricked or 
disabled as, for example, the humidity sensor can be obstructed [61]. 
Removing the battery would stop logging and possibly lead to data corruption 
[61]. If one wanted to it would be possible to remove and/or destroy the TDL. 
These sorts of attacks on the TDL are not considered further and it is, for the 
purposes of this thesis, generally assumed that the TDL records data that can 
be relied upon. 
4.3.1. Assumptions 
The sender and recipient are assumed to have complete trust between one 
another. The PIN code is set by the sender and is then shared with the 
recipient so that they can interact fully with the TDL. This PIN must be kept 
from all others as anyone with knowledge of the PIN in contact with the TDL 
device has complete power over the device’s capabilities. This includes 
clearing the TDL data or resetting it to factory settings. 
The details of the threat model used for designing and assessing the 
adequacy of the PIN protection can only be found in internal Bosch 
documentation. 
4.3.2. PIN protection 
PIN creation and sharing relies completely on the human factor. This 
opens several avenues of attack such as social engineering and attacks on the 
human to human PIN exchange. All privileged interactions are shielded with 
the same PIN code, set by the humans. 
Humans are known to set and store PIN codes and other passwords in 
insecure ways [63]. It is not unlikely that the same person would set up several 
TDLs to use the same PIN code, as reuse of passwords is common [64]. The 
way the PIN is shared would likely be using some form of telecommunication 
such as e-mail, text messaging or phone calls. Leaving written copies of the 
PIN code is an obvious source of potential distribution of the PIN to actors of 
malicious intent, especially if these copies are unprotected and/or 
unencrypted. Speaking the PIN code out loud on the phone can quite literally 
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be eavesdropped by another human who happens to overhear the 
conversation. 
In addition to the human element the connection between the device and 
smartphone app using Bluetooth must also be secure against eavesdropping 
of the PIN code as well as other attacks. The state of Bluetooth security was 
as examined 4 years ago in [65] generally bleak, and fundamental threats 
remain today [66]. This includes general inability to adequately protect 
Bluetooth network traffic, such as sending the PIN from the phone to the TDL 
device, from eavesdropping. 
4.3.3. Data protection 
While on the TDL device, the log data is stored using flash memory on 
the circuit board. This data storage contains no other security features other 
than the relative sophistication needed by an attacker wishing to directly 
manipulate the flash memory. The process for modifying NAND flash 
memory, as done in [67], is considered time-consuming and it also leaves 
physical traces. It should be considered a rather sophisticated attack. 
Once the data is downloaded from the device no further protection or 
integrity check is provided. The downloaded data is in the form of an 
unsigned and unencrypted text file.  
Being able to download a TDL’s data means one also has the power to 
wipe the data from the TDL after having done so. Doing so makes it 
impossible to verify the source or accuracy of the data in any way. 
It should be noted here that data signing is one of the features under 
current development at Bosch, but this thesis is, as mentioned previously, 
based on the baseline version. 
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Part II. Evaluation 
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5. TDL blockchain system 
As per the problem statement of this thesis, this section will deal with 
how blockchain technology can be used to attribute TDL data points to 
specific transport chain actors and how the reliability of that data can be 
increased. 
 Reasons for using blockchain 
Blockchain systems provide a framework for actors in different trust 
domains to reach consensus over some set of data.  
This holds true in the transportation sector where several different 
companies cooperate to deliver goods from sender to recipient. While 
cooperating they still do not trust each other in that any one actor would not 
want to take blame for mistakes done by other actors. Reaching consensus on 
where goods were damaged or mishandled provides benefits to several actors. 
Between transport chain actors the benefit is that any negative 
repercussions are aimed at the appropriate actor. The benefit for sender and 
recipient comes from knowing if the transported objects themselves survived 
the transport and being able to choose to not provide further business to 
misbehaving actors. If a transport chain actor has provided all employees with 
separate identities then shipping errors could also be traced within a company 
to a specific employee, if the blockchain system is built to support it.  
Drawbacks come from having to develop, set up and maintain the system 
in co-operation with other companies and from a potentially increased time 
spent handing goods off between transport chain actors.  
5.1.1. Tracking responsibility 
As mentioned in Section 1.4, blockchain technology adoption for use in 
supply chains is promising. Much of that promise comes from providing a 
common system to reliably trace a package or product in a way that allows 
relevant parties to view the complete history of it [1] [68]. This common 
system would, if implemented correctly, provide all the benefits of 
blockchain technology such as immutability and trustable data storage and 
transaction conduction in a distrusting environment. 
This work is directly related to the problem of attributing TDL data points 
to specific actors. If these handoffs of packages between actors are already 
recorded in a secure blockchain system attributing data points to specific 
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actors would simply entail tying the sensor data generated between each 
handoff to the responsible actor.  
To avoid making assumptions about clock synchronicity and reliability, 
a specific handoff is tied to the data as it has been factually accrued up to that 
point in time. This is done by syncing what data is contained on-device as 
part of the handoff procedure.  
5.1.2. Data reliability 
A blockchain system can be used to make sure that some piece of data is 
stored unchangeably. That data must however already be “good”, as simply 
putting it on the blockchain does not transfer any properties to it other than 
that of immutability. As [27] argues “the 'truth level' of on-chain information 
is only as good as barriers employed to […] ensure the quality of data being 
added is high” which means that blockchain technology is in some ways ‘just’ 
a container for already trustable data. 
Tying a blockchain event or some data on the blockchain to the real world 
still requires the same PKI-based solutions common today, including 
certificates created by certificate authorities to attest to some entity’s identity. 
This means that for TDL data to be considered trustworthy on the 
blockchain it must already be considered trustworthy beyond the blockchain. 
This requires the TDL devices to carry their own digital identities attested by 
a trusted third party, likely Bosch. The TDL device would then have to use 
this digital identity to sign for any data leaving it, creating the necessary link 
between device and data needed to produce trust in that the data is genuinely 
from the device. This would have to include protections against re-use of 
signatures, see Section 2.5. 
Because of the immutability of blockchain technology, manipulations to 
the TDL data would have to take place before the data is committed to the 
blockchain. Unless, of course, the blockchain network is completely taken 
over/down and the on-blockchain data is wiped from existence at all or 
arguably some majority of peers. 
5.1.3. Assumptions 
By automating some of the PIN handling procedures, see Section 5.3.5, 
there is no longer a need for complete trust between sender and recipient. The 
sender never becomes aware of the PIN code and only the recipient can get 
the PIN code.  
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The trust assumptions for the blockchain system itself is a bit more 
complex. The organizations do not have to trust a common third party4, but 
instead need to place at least some measurement of trust in the public key 
infrastructures of the other organizations. They are trusted to protect their 
PKI, or looking at it from the opposite end the companies agree to some form 
of mutual distrust where blame should be placed at the organization tied to 
the PKI that was responsible for a TDL-enabled package at the point of any 
recorded violations. Of course, a single identity from that PKI performed the 
blockchain transaction but in the inter-organizational context that isn’t 
particularly relevant, as the blame is placed organizationally. 
Keeping a project open-source, at least between all relevant 
organizations, is a good way to produce trust in the system, including the 
chaincode responsible for all transactions. The trust would come from 
participating actors being able to verify, and contribute to, the system’s 
operation. At the same time, this relies on the participating actors performing 
their due diligence and that can not be taken for granted to be true. 
The issue of trusting software can of course be taken to the impractical 
extreme, where “you should write your own code, but also your own 
compiler, and run that on hardware which you designed and engraved 
yourself: you cannot trust the machine unless you started with a bucket of 
sand (for silicon, the main component of semiconductors)” [69]. See [70] for 
a good, but old, discussion on trust in software. 
 Choosing blockchain type and system 
To choose what blockchain system should be used several important 
characteristics of blockchains in general had to be identified. The first step 
was to take a step back and determine whether blockchain is a relevant 
technology at all. This has already been addressed in Section 5.1, but for 
clarity the decision tree detailed in Section 5.2.2 will include whether to use 
blockchain or not. 
                                                          
 
4 As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, the TDLs need digital identities. Bosch providing 
these would in effect make Bosch a trusted third party. Other schemes could be 
envisioned where these identities are instead provided with the involvement of 
several organizations in such a way that one of them need not be trusted fully. In 
practice, the trusted third-party route is probably simpler to implement. 
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As the choice between permissioned and permissionless includes many 
considerations it is difficult to isolate the choice to a single factor. 
5.2.1. Important criteria 
The main criteria used to choose between permissionless and 
permissioned blockchains is the nature of participation. Using the following 
reasoning, the decision was made to use a permissioned system. 
A system required to track responsibility of some real-world object needs 
to connect the identities of who interacts with the blockchain and real-world 
entities. These connections can plausibly be made in a permissionless 
blockchain system by making chaincode use some form of PKI in its 
decisions. This would in effect just be implementing a heavy permissioned 
layer on top of the permissionless blockchain system. Instead, linking 
blockchain network identities to physical entities can be made with a 
permissioned system that is purpose-built for doing just that.  
To choose between the prominent permissioned blockchain 
implementations Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Sawtooth, the most 
important factors were their choice of consensus and assessed maturity. 
Sawtooth uses proof of elapsed time, potentially introducing some of the 
performance drawbacks associated with permissionless blockchain 
technology. This is in addition to the reliance on a single hardware vendor 
and the unproven nature of the consensus methodology. Fabric uses BFT, a 
both well-explored and well-performing consensus method. 
On the point of maturity, a subjective choice had to be made based on 
availability of example code, documentation, SDK etc. Fabric having a longer 
history, a 1.0 release, and some supposedly production-level implementations 
all weighed in its favor against Sawtooth. 
5.2.2. Decision tree 
The decision tree in Fig. 17 is based in part on similar decision trees from 
[27] and [71]. The purpose of it is to visualize the decision between traditional 
databases and blockchain technology and then the choice between a 
permissioned and permissionless blockchain system. 
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Fig. 17. Decision tree on what general type of blockchain system to use, 
permissioned or permissionless. To highlight the fact that 
blockchains are not necessarily applicable in all situations the 
decision tree also includes whether to use blockchain at all. 
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To choose between the Hyperledger projects Fabric and Sawtooth several 
factors were considered. As per the reasoning in Section 5.2.1 Fabric was 
chosen as the basis of the proof-of-concept TDL blockchain system. 
 Proof-of-concept implementation 
As part of this thesis a TDL blockchain system using Hyperledger Fabric 
was developed. The premise is that all transport chain actors agree to use this 
common blockchain system to track all TDL-enabled packages. The proof of 
concept uses four mock organizations simply called Org1, Org2, Org3 and 
Org4. They each run network nodes on a common network and channel, and 
are all able to conduct TDL-related transactions using the developed 
chaincode. 
Because of implementation scope and limitations, there are several 
aspects of the system that are not representable of a production-level system. 
Some of these are inherited from Fabric, some from the TDL system and 
some from a simple lack of time and/or scope to implement them. Major 
deviations are the handling of cryptographic materials, using a bridge-gap 
solution for the app, and the lack of chaincode access control and TDL data 
signing. 
5.3.1. Versions used 
The proof of concept is a product of its time and knowing something 
about the exact version numbers used is useful to ascertain what 
circumstances surrounded development.  
The operating system used for development was Ubuntu-based OSD4. 
The TDL system version numbers can be seen in Section 4.2. 
For Hyperledger Fabric, version 1.0.1 was used for the Java SDK and the 
Fabric images (ca, tools, couchdb, kafka, orderer, peer, javaenv, ccenv). The 
Fabric image “baseos” carries the version number 0.3.2 but is the most recent 
in relation to the others used. 
The Fabric images run in Docker version 17.06.2 with Docker-compose 
at version 1.8.0. Docker provides a form of virtualization of the operating 
system without needing to use full virtual machines. 
The Android app was modified for the proof of concept with Android 
Studio version 2.3.3, and the Samsung phones used to test the app had 
Android 7.0 installed. 
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5.3.2. Use case 
Since the system is built on blockchain technology, a technology based 
and reliant on a decentralized network, the transport chain actors must run 
and maintain nodes that communicate with one another to make up a 
blockchain network. These nodes include endorsing peers and ordering 
nodes.  
The TDL app is used by the transport chain actors every time a TDL-
enabled package switches hands from one actor to another. This would 
include intra-organizational transfers of responsibility, if desired by that 
specific organization. That choice comes more from how their MSP is set up 
than from a specific blockchain system design choice. For the purposes of 
this proof of concept a single person/identity will represent their entire 
organization, at least in terms of TDL app usage. The general use case for the 
transport chain actors (involved in the transport of a TDL-package) is 
illustrated in Fig. 18.  
 
Fig. 18. Alice registers the TDL-package to the Blockchain system with the 
TDL app, while connected to the TDL device. As part of the physical 
handoff of the package to Bob they perform the ownership 
transference procedure (blockchain handoff). The new owner, Bob, 
connects to the TDL with their app and requests ownership of it. As 
part of the request a signed data summary from the TDL is included. 
The current owner, Alice, accepts the request from their own TDL 
app, although not while connected to the device. This is repeated 
every step of the way until the final recipient David becomes the 
owner. 
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The setup is that the package sender uses the app to set up the TDL sensor 
parameters. The sender then registers the specific shipment to the TDL 
blockchain system with the app. The on-blockchain data is illustrated in Fig. 
19. As part of registration the TDL app starts the TDL device logging 
functionality and changes the PIN, see Section 5.3.6. 
Once the registration process is completed the package makes its way to 
the next transport chain actor. That actor will use their smartphone with the 
TDL app, using their own blockchain network credentials, to request that 
ownership of the TDL-package is transferred to them. Proposals are requested 
while connected to the TDL in question. As part of this proposal, the on-
device data summary is included. This data summary is signed by the TDL. 
The current owner is then able to respond to that proposal using their TDL 
app. The response is either an accept, where the ownership is transferred, or 
a rejection, which means the ownership of the TDL is unchanged. This entire 
sequence of events is illustrated by a state diagram in Fig. 20. In Fig. 21, parts 
of this sequence are illustrated with two screenshots. 
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Fig. 19. An illustration of the on-chain data structure. The Transport object 
represents the entire transportation chain for a specific package, 
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from registration to final delivery. It does this with data from the 
actual registration, such as the identity of the TDL and the 
parameters of its setup. Ownership proposals can be made and will 
appear as part of the Transport object. These contain the data 
summary provided to the TDL app by the TDL device. Ownership 
proposals that are actively rejected or accepted are saved explicitly 
as being either accepted or rejected. Note that the “Actionable” 
Boolean variable for ChangeProposal is always set to true for real 
proposals, it only exists because there was a technical need to allow 
the adding of an ‘unactionable’ mock proposal as part of the 
registration procedure. Note also that all transactions involving the 
object are saved by the blockchain system as part of the meta-data. 
Explicitly saving information in directly retrievable objects makes it 
more easily accessible. 
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Fig. 20. The different states of a Transport object. The Transport with its 
unique identifier is registered. Any number of ownership changes 
can then occur. Once an ownership change to the registration-
defined final recipient is made, no further changes can be made. 
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Fig. 21. Left: TDL app with a confirmation pop-up for requesting ownership. 
Right: The accept/reject pop-up as seen by the current owner. Right 
screenshot has been altered to show all information at once. 
5.3.3. Technical overview 
The proof-of-concept network has 4 peers, one for each organization. 
These all have the proof of concept “Transport” chaincode installed on them 
so that they can act as endorsing peers. The endorsement policy is set up as a 
threshold scheme, requiring any three out of the four organizations to endorse 
a Transport chaincode transaction. The peers and ordering service is provided 
as part of Hyperledger Fabric and they are written in the Go programming 
language. The Transport chaincode is written as part of the proof of concept, 
also in Go. 
Because the BFT ordering service has not yet been implemented in the 
version of Hyperledger Fabric used for development the ordering service for 
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the proof of concept is of the “single orderer” variety. This means that a single 
orderer node from the separate mock organization OrdererOrg is used to 
represent the ordering service. As the lack of a BFT Ordering Service is 
considered transient, the evaluation will assume the use of a BFT ordering 
service. The network layout is illustrated in Fig. 22. 
 
Fig. 22. Left: The single orderer type network used in the proof of concept. 
Each organization has one peer each and they all connect to the same 
separately held orderer that represents the ordering service. The 
single orderer network is for development purposes only. 
Right: A BFT implementation of the ordering service where each 
organization runs its own orderer. 
In a production-level environment these nodes would all be in different 
geographic locations (and have redundancy in the form of extra back-up 
peers) but for development purposes they are all run in Docker containers on 
the same computer. 
A default membership service provider implementation is used. To read 
more about the MSPs and the use of cryptographic materials in the proof of 
concept, see Section 5.3.4. 
To set up, generate data/credentials for, initialize, start and stop the 
blockchain network, various bash scripts were created to produce the required 
results. These were based on scripts included with the Hyperledger Fabric 
samples. 
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A blockchain network client (invoker of chaincode) can implement as 
many checks as it wants but another client can always be written and used to 
bypass those checks. This means that the Transport chaincode is the only 
place where trustable verifications of facts can occur. The chaincode must 
verify that signatures for TDL data are correct, that only those authorized to 
perform certain invocations can perform them, and perform all other 
verifications needed to assure that only trustable data enters the blockchain 
system database. Some of these checks were implemented as part of the proof 
of concept but as, for example, the chaincode-level access control 
mechanisms are not available in the current version of Fabric that specific 
verification functionality is missing. 
Effort was made to try and use the Java Fabric Client SDK on Android 
directly, but it did not work. Porting the SDK to Android as part of the thesis 
would have been a more time expensive effort than could be afforded.  
Speculatively, previous smartphone-related Fabric projects may have 
used the REST API available in earlier versions of Hyperledger Fabric [72]. 
Reading [72] highlights some of the issues that are relevant to use of that 
peer-level REST API. 
The bridge-gap solution devised is just for demo purposes, porting the 
SDK to Android is the acceptable production-level solution. The bridge-gap 
solution is that a separate PC Java application is used to communicate with 
the Fabric network. The Android app uses the Java application’s command-
line interface over SSH. The TDL blockchain system overview is illustrated 
in Fig. 23. 
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Fig. 23. Above: The TDL acts as a data signer and provides that data to the 
TDL app over Bluetooth. The app, with Fabric SDK, uses TLS to 
connect to the Fabric network and conduct transactions. 
Below: As the current SDK was found to be Android incompatible 
a bridge-gap solution was devised. An SDK-enabled Java 
application runs on a computer and communicates with the 
blockchain network over TLS. The TDL app connects to the 
computer over SSH and interacts with the command-line interface 
of the Java SDK-enabled application. The bridge-gap solution is for 
demonstration purposes only. 
The PC client application developed as part of the proof of concept uses 
the Hyperledger Fabric Java SDK to communicate with the rest of the 
blockchain system network. It enables the use case described in Section 5.3.2 
by invoking the necessary Transport chaincode functions and driving the 
transaction process as described in Section 3.7.2. The client application is 
written in Java. 
The Android app, was modified from the baseline version, see Section 
4.2, to support the use case in Section 5.3.2. 
The software architecture, limitations etc. of the TDL device itself was 
researched using Bosch internal documentation, but no code changes were 
ultimately made to TDL firmware. The only change would have been the 
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inclusion of data signing, see Section 5.3.5. The TDL device software is 
written in C. 
5.3.4. Cryptographic materials 
The proof of concept makes no attempt to achieve production level 
standards of handling cryptographic materials. All keys and certificates were 
generated using the Fabric-provided tool “cryptogen”, and they require no 
passwords to use. The default MSP implementation is used where the 
credentials are simply stored locally at each network node. This whole setup 
is just for development and testing purposes and is not in any way suggested 
to be used in a production-level environment. In that case the organizations 
would all use their, most likely pre-existing, PKIs as MSPs. 
5.3.5. TDL data summary 
The data summary broadcast by the TDL includes counters for each type 
of violation. These counters are only one byte in size, allowing for the counter 
to reach 254 (the 255 value is reserved for “violation type turned off”). 
Ideally, the summary should include three things: an accurate summary 
of the data, a signature of that summary and a signature of the complete log 
data. 
Signing of the data summary (or the main data store) of the TDL is not 
implemented either currently or as part of this thesis. The problem of signing 
data is an already solved one and implementing it as part of this thesis was 
not done as it would have taken too much time without furthering the goals 
of the thesis. 
5.3.6. Semi-automatic PIN handling 
As opposed to the completely manual PIN handling of the current TDL 
system the TDL blockchain system would include a sort of semi-automatic 
PIN handling. The PIN would be generated by the app as part of the 
registration process. This PIN would, after being set to the TDL, immediately 
be encrypted using the public key of the final recipient. The ciphertext of the 
PIN would be included as part of the registration information supplied to the 
blockchain system. 
This would ensure that the only human with access to the PIN would be 
the final recipient, lowering the possibility of the PIN spreading beyond the 
person it is needed by. Once the package was transferred to the recipient the 
app would automatically decrypt the PIN using the recipients private key, and 
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use the decrypted PIN to change the TDL PIN to some default value such as 
0000. It would also stop logging and download the complete log data. 
 Summary 
Hyperledger Fabric was used to build a TDL Blockchain System. The 
system records each TDL package handoff by the actors performing a handoff 
procedure. The procedure includes uploading TDL data to the blockchain 
system.  The handoff procedure is performed using the TDL app to connect 
to the TDL device and to the blockchain network. 
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Part III. Conclusions 
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6. Discussion 
The general field of blockchain technology is discussed in Section 6.1, 
followed by a discussion surrounding the TDL blockchain system and its 
proof of concept in Section 6.2. 
 Blockchain technology 
It is hard not to gain an overall positive image of the future of blockchain 
technology, even with knowledge of its drawbacks. The potential for its use 
in sectors requiring consensus for data in an environment of distrust is there, 
but it is ultimately up to business leaders to assess whether that potential is 
worth pursuing. Down the road of blockchain adoption are several and severe 
hurdles to overcome. 
In a big-picture view, blockchain technology could be trusted to 
immutably store data. The immutability is extremely dependent on not only 
the technology itself but also how and by who it is used.  
The longest-chain rule of proof-of-work blockchains means that as good 
as every single transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain could be reversed, even 
though doing so would be extremely computationally costly. A system that 
with consensus finality, such as Hyperledger Fabric, has a better technical 
protection of data immutability, but real-world circumstances such as 
participating companies deciding to shut the system down could completely 
render that technical protection useless. As put in Section 3.4, the 
immutability is not a property inherent to the technology but a result of some 
larger consensus, even beyond the code that make up the regular consensus 
process. 
6.1.1. Maturity, hype and signaling 
A goal of this thesis has been to stick to reality as much as possible in the 
context of the massive hype surrounding blockchain technology. 
Bitcoin is almost a decade old but blockchain technology research and 
development has not really exploded until the last couple of years. Maturity 
must be considered low as even the most mature of systems are either 
extremely basic (Bitcoin) or lack crucial features (Hyperledger Fabric). 
News of large companies joining or announcing blockchain technology 
projects are many, exemplified recently by Microsoft, Samsung and IOTA 
[73]. As acutely identified by Narula, see Section 3.4, projects having big 
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names attached to them does not necessarily translate to real-world viability 
or technical excellence. 
Similar thoughts to those expressed in this thesis regarding the maturity 
of blockchain technology are independently expressed in [74] where you can 
find a larger discussion and exploration of that topic. 
6.1.2. Permissionless vs permissioned blockchains 
Permissionless systems using proof-of-work have several drawbacks that 
make them quite unsuitable for latency averse use cases such as the fast-paced 
world of transportation. These include having to wait for enough proof-of-
work to be accrued to be able to consider a transaction properly committed to 
the blockchain. Introducing hours of delays for every single package is, even 
not considering anything else, quite frankly unacceptable. Permissioned 
systems are much better in this regard, supporting a much larger amount of 
transactions per second and quickly adding them permanently to the 
blockchain. 
Proof-of-stake is not yet proven to be a dependable form of consensus. It 
could alleviate many of the resource and capacity problems associated with 
proof-of-work but at the cost of using an unproven consensus form. Only once 
proof-of-stake has been properly developed and researched to be reliable can 
it be considered for implementation in a system such as the one this thesis is 
about. 
All permissionless systems suffer from a fundamental privacy issue. All 
data supplied to the permissionless blockchain is per definition shared with 
the public. Encrypting the data before supplying it to the blockchain so it 
could only be read by some subset of peers could increase the likelihood of 
bad data being supplied to the system. If the blockchain system chaincode 
can’t read the data, it does not have any ability to assess the reliability of that 
data. Permissioned systems have a chance of increased data privacy as data 
is kept between identifiable organizations. But because the data is stored in 
multiple places and by multiple parties the possibility of a data leak is 
increased, see the ‘weakest link’ adage. 
There is always a cost associated with running a blockchain system. Some 
of the cost for a permissionless system comes in the form of hardware and 
electricity. For a proof-of-work system the electricity demand is huge, 
meaning that hosting these network nodes comes with a big electricity bill. 
Even without the cost of running proof-of-work nodes all transactions would 
still need to be paid for with some form of (crypto-)currency. For example, 
running chaincode on Ethereum costs “gas”, and transactions for Bitcoin are, 
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at least in the long term, supported by transaction fees to the miners who add 
the transactions to their blocks.  
For permissioned systems, setting up network nodes is a bit more like 
hosting traditional servers and the cost likely more predictable. However, the 
total cost for setting up and maintaining the system, as it requires so much 
inter-organizational cooperation, is likely quite large. The level of 
cooperation required is an identified hurdle for adopting (permissioned) 
blockchain technology [1] [5]. The required inter-organizational cooperation 
cannot benefit from any established standards further increasing the workload 
on all parties. All participating organizations would have to keep people 
employed for the explicit purpose of running the network, writing the 
chaincode etc. Trusting a single actor with these things would effectively 
centralize the system.The nodes (and chaincode development/analysis) must 
be in direct and competent control of the individual participating 
organizations for the system to provide any benefit at all as compared to a 
traditional database system. Ceding control means abandoning what makes 
blockchain technology special. 
 The TDL blockchain system and its proof of concept 
Conceptually, a system like this provides benefits of data storage and 
attribution but the issues surrounding it are numerous and considerable. The 
goal of attribution is met conceptually but not in reality, as the blockchain 
data and metadata cannot be enforced to overlap completely as per the current 
lack of access control for chaincode. 
For large companies with high technical competence the maintenance 
problem, see Section 6.1.1, is most likely not an issue but for smaller local 
companies the work needed to maintain such a system could be too advanced 
and expensive in terms of manpower. Not participating would mean that they 
could not handle TDL packages as the premise of the system is that everyone 
who takes responsibility for the TDL-package must also do so as part of the 
blockchain system. Shifting the maintenance work to other parties would 
likely increase centralization. 
Beyond the maintenance problem the additional costs are potentially very 
high, though not necessarily directly monetary. Everything regarding the 
usage of the system must be considered, including the actual human beings 
that would have to use it every day. Every single organization, and inter-
organizationally every employee, who could come into contact with a TDL-
equipped package would have to agree (and be trained) to take part in the 
blockchain system and to always use it to handle TDL packages. 
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A package can, of course, be completely sent through the transport chain 
without all handoffs being recorded to the blockchain but that would cause 
an irreparable rift in the data attribution accuracy, see Section 6.2.1 for further 
discussions about differences in historical and documental truth. This could 
be done unknowingly too, a TDL-equipped package could be contained 
within some larger multi-package container and not immediately apparent to 
the handoff parties resulting in the blockchain handoff never taking place. 
The question is of course raised what the ultimate justification for 
participating in a system like the one in this thesis is. This is ultimately a 
subjective judgement for the business leaders. Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 
contain some justifications that could be used to motivate such a decision. 
The proof of concept suffers from definite technical issues, including 
those associated with Fabric itself, see Section 5.3. 
About PIN-handling: there is still the possibility of the recipient using 
their private key to manually decrypt the PIN code before they receive the 
package. They would then be able to spread the PIN code similarly to the 
current system, compromising the TDL security solution. This could 
potentially be solved with some sort of threshold scheme to decrypt the PIN 
code only once the package is delivered.  
6.2.1. Historical vs documental truth 
To make sure the data points are attributed to the correct transport chain 
actor, the handoff procedure must be correctly performed at every single 
physical handoff of TDL packages from one actor to another. 
Even if done correctly, the TDL data summary uploaded as part of the 
handoff does not necessarily completely overlap with the raw TDL data. The 
limited capacity violation counters being the main reason. On-device data 
could still be manipulated between each handoff given enough technical 
expertise. Including a signature for the complete data in addition to the 
summary could alleviate some of these problems. 
Even if all TDL data points are accurately recorded and stored on the 
blockchain, the package could still be completely destroyed/ruined along the 
way. A package could, for example, be opened and the contents stolen, or the 
package could be damaged in the form of cutting. There is simply not a 
complete overlap between the sensor values recorded by the TDL and all 
adverse effects that could affect the package. This is not really evaluated as 
part of the thesis, but still important enough to at least acknowledge. A 
handoff procedure including some sort of visual inspection could help 
alleviate some of these problems. 
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It is not specifically adressed in the proof of concept, but how to 
ultimately handle the complete log data once the package is delivered is 
important. It would likely require code changes all the way from the TDL 
device to the chaincode but uploading the complete data as part of the final 
handoff could be implemented. Other ways of handling it is discussed in 
Section 6.2.2. The larger question is the one of storing certain data on- or off-
chain, see Section 3.5. Storing it on the blockchain would increase storage 
demands and increase the connection between the blockchain system and the 
raw TDL data. Storing it off-chain, perhaps in some other database, with the 
blockchain only containing the summary and its signature along with the 
signature of the complete raw data would decrease required blockchain 
network node storage. Uploading a megabyte of complete log data is not 
necessarily easy either. Mobile data cannot be assumed to be fast, or 
available, everywhere TDL-equipped packages would need to be handed off 
between actors. 
6.2.2. Other blockchain system solutions 
If the TDL device were to be equipped with internet connectivity, the 
possibility to use it as a blockchain network client and/or node opens. As the 
TDL baseline used in this thesis does not include internet connectivity the 
discussion of this ‘future TDL’ is mostly speculative. 
The requirements for a peer are in the case of Hyperledger Fabric quite 
heavy, at least in terms of network and storage usage. A peer needs to store 
the complete channel blockchain, a big ask of a device currently only 
equipped with 1MB of log data storage. The firmware storage is even smaller. 
The entire Hyperledger Fabric network peer code, including its dependencies, 
would have to be ported to the C language used by the TDL firmware. A task 
that even just by itself is quite monumental. Restricting the use of the TDL to 
that of a Fabric client would mean not needing to store the blockchain. The 
network traffic associated with driving the transaction process is still 
considerable compared to a simple data transfer. For the sake of a frame of 
reference for code storage requirements, the linux-amd64 Fabric peer binary 
and the Java SDK both used in this thesis are roughly 20MB in size each. The 
blockchain data would, admittedly with a different but related system, require 
orders of magnitude more storage than currently available on the TDL [75]. 
Considering a “local” blockchain is pointless. A blockchain that is not 
network-distributed offers no more ‘real’ protection of its data than that of 
signatures. Anyone with read/write access could easily delete it. Blockchain 
data immutability comes from both network distribution and the data 
structure, not from either or. 
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On the question of uploading the entire log data versus just the summary 
there are a few tradeoffs. Uploading all data would decrease battery life as 
more network traffic would be required. The TDL would of course also have 
to be updated to allow full log data downloads without PIN access.  
Suppose the TDL uploaded its data to the blockchain automatically, 
directly from the device. This would likely offer good data protection, 
assuming secure connection procedures and well-enforced TDL digital 
identities and data signatures. Loss of internet access or otherwise sparse data 
uploads, deliberate or otherwise, could cause a gap between the TDL’s data 
as recorded on the blockchain and on the device. This would lead to similar 
data attribution difficulties as with the current TDL system, having to use 
timestamps to arbitrate between which data existed before or after a certain 
handoff took place. This means the handoff procedure would still have to 
include a sync between the on-device data and the blockchain to accurately 
be able to attribute exactly which data points occurred in relation to what 
actor was responsible for the TDL at a certain point in time. 
Using a relatively limited device, common in Internet of Things (IoT), as 
a proof-of-work blockchain network node would quite likely not be 
worthwhile as such a system requires a large amount of CPU-cycles, 
electricity and available storage. Instead the device would have to talk to 
some sort of intermediary server. This would require complete trust in that 
server to perform the correct tasks with that data. A catch-22 scenario can be 
envisioned where a device would need an intermediary server to connect to 
the blockchain network in its place but to independently verify that this is 
properly done the device would have to completely implement the network 
node functionality rendering the intermediary server pointless. 
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7. Future work 
In a permissioned blockchain system mapping real-world power 
structures to a few dozen network nodes would take considerable work. 
Making sure participating organizations do not become de-facto Sybil 
identities would require mapping complicated corporate structures and 
ownership schemes and accurately reflecting them in the network power 
distribution. As existing participating organizations close, are acquired and 
new ones emerge and need to be included being able to maintain the network 
power structures in relation to those of the real world changing would again 
be a source of potential research. 
An area that is of great importance, especially for consideration of using 
internet-of-things devices as peers, is the one of blockchains having an ever-
increasing storage footprint. It is important to research long-term solutions to 
this problem. For more information regarding this issue, see [75]. 
Other research into the consequences of running blockchain networks 
long-term is needed. Permissionless systems explored in this thesis depend 
on the distribution, and at times re-distribution, of some sort of blockchain-
based token to incentivize network participation. Research exploring the links 
between the real-world token value, its intra- and extra-blockchain use and 
the overall health of the blockchain network could yield intriguing results. 
Researching the link between on-blockchain data and the real world is an 
area of great potential. Making sure the on-blockchain data accurately reflects 
the real world requires rigorous blockchain system verifications. Finding the 
best ways of performing these, with or without the need for trusted third 
parties, would have an impact on what use cases for blockchain technology 
can be considered viable. That includes the TDL blockchain system of this 
thesis, where the gap between historical and documental truth is a source of 
much potential headache. 
There is still a large amount of research and development needed to bring 
the proof of concept developed as part of this thesis into a fully developed 
product, if one wanted to do so. For example, several features of Fabric 
needed to make the product work are simply not yet developed, most 
importantly the sort of chaincode level access control needed to verify the 
connection between the owner of a TDL and who is invoking the owner-
changing chaincode. 
As the Transport Data Logger examined in the thesis is a snapshot in time 
of a product in active development the blockchain solution could of course 
change as the capabilities of the Transport Data Logger device becomes more 
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capable. For instance, once the TDL device has network access the 
possibilities of directly using it as a blockchain network node emerges. 
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8. Summary 
The field of blockchain is still in its infancy and there is a lot of work that 
can and should be done in the field. There are huge hurdles to overcome and 
its adoption depends on if the advantage of more decentralized and trustable 
data storage and distribution is worth getting over the hurdles for. 
Because the hype and promise of blockchain technology is so massive 
finding and pointing to the problems associated with it, as has been done in 
this thesis, feels somewhat like raining on its parade. 
Blockchain technology should be considered when wanting to keep data 
safe from manipulation, but it is important to recognize that blockchains are 
only capable of protecting the data provided to them. If a blockchain system 
is fed data that cannot already be considered trustworthy then the system will 
not make that data trustworthy, only immutable. And even that is with some 
important asterisks such as distribution of blockchain network power and 
putting trust in blockchain system developers. 
This thesis is very much a product of its time. I fully anticipate similar 
future theses on blockchain technology to yield different and likely more 
impressive results because of the volatile, nascent, and fast-moving nature of 
the field. 
8.1.1. Question 1 – Permissioned vs permissionless blockchains 
What are the different strengths and weaknesses of permissioned and 
permissionless blockchains? 
Permissionless systems scale better to many thousands of nodes, whereas 
permissioned systems only support twenty or so nodes. They both support 
thousands of clients. Permissionless systems can be a lot more decentralized 
thanks to supporting an enormous number of nodes. This comes at the cost of 
poor transaction performance with high latencies and low transaction 
bandwidth.  
Permissionless systems using proof-of-work use (or arguably waste) an 
enormous amount of electricity. Permissioned systems require rigorous use 
of public key infrastructure and a huge amount of inter-organizational 
cooperation. 
8.1.2. Question 2 – Data reliability 
How can blockchain technology be used to increase the reliability of the 
Transport Data Logger data? 
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The data can be trusted to be stored immutably, which does technically 
increase reliability, but blockchain technology does not itself make the data 
more trustworthy. In other words, the data itself is only as trustworthy as it is 
outside the blockchain system. This means that all the usual practices of data 
signing are still just as required to provide a trusted connection between the 
real-world and the on-blockchain data. 
Periodically uploading (signed) data automatically could potentially 
increase reliability. This would require internet connectivity and is not 
possible with the current TDL device. 
8.1.3. Question 3 – Data attribution 
How can blockchain technology be used to attribute specific data points 
from the Transport Data Logger to specific transport chain actors? 
A permissioned blockchain system requiring rigorous use of inter-
organizational PKI can be used to attribute specific data points to individual 
organizations and, if needed, individuals within those organizations. 
Uploading data points as they have been accumulated up to the precise time 
of the package handoff means that a direct connection between the log data 
and the responsible actor is established.  
Other solutions that would potentially increase data reliability such as 
automatic uploads have the potential to weaken the link between the two 
unless the handoff upload is somehow still part of the process. 
8.1.4. Recommendation on blockchain technology adoption 
For organizations who want to get in on the ground floor and help develop 
the underlying systems and standards this is the time to do so. For those not 
interested in doing that or who just wants to use finished software the 
blockchain technology sector is not yet ready for them. It will likely be years 
before it is. 
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